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As cereals are the most Important arable crop for food sup-
ply in the world, they have always attracted the attention of 
(agricultural) economists and politicians. Within the EC, the 
cereals policy is seen as a cornerstone of the Common Agricul-
tural Policy (CAP). This fact is demonstrated again in the recent 
proposals of the Commission, concerning 'the development and 
future of the Common Agricultural Policy' in the EC; it is pro-
posed to change the EC cereal policy instruments first and most 
radically. 
In 1988, the Agricultural Economics Research Institute pub-
lished a study concerning the EC cereal policy. This paper starts 
from that study and evaluates the expected effects of three 
recently introduced new instruments: Maximum Guaranteed Quan-
tities for cereals, oilseeds and protein crops; the EC set-aside 
programme; and extensification. 
This study was written in 1989 and published in France in 
September 1991 in 'Cahier d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales' under 
the heading 'Une évaluation des instruments de la politique 
céréalière de la CEE'. As it was originally written in English 
and it is expected that a number of interested policy-makers, 
businessmen, scholars and students are more familiar with the 
English than the French language, we decided to publish the orig-
inal text as well. 
,The Director 
The Hague, February 1992 /L.C.\ zachariasse 
1. Introduction 
What is the problem of the arable sector in the European 
agricultural sector? Is it the fact that farmers produce more 
than the market demands or is it its low degree of competitive-
ness compared to cereal exporters such as the United States of 
Americaf Canada and Australia? Or are the EC cereal prices simply 
too high and should they be decreased to lower supply, increase 
demand and stimulate competition? These are just some of the 
questions we will dwell upon in this study. 
Like most socio-economic problems, the EC cereal surplus 
problem seems to increase in complexity the longer it is studied. 
Simple statements like this do not recognize this complex prob-
lem, however. The cereal policy is the cornerstone of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), therefore it cannot be considered in 
isolation from the other crops. It even has a strong Impact on 
the intensive livestock and dairy sector. The consequences for 
the horticultural sector may be less, but even there they will 
not be totally absent. The income of the farmers in all those 
sectors are influenced by changing the cereal policy. A coherent 
analysis should also take into account the consequences for tax-
payers, consumers and the industries dependent on the agricul-
tural sector. 
It is relatively easy to 'invent' a new instrument, to say 
that it is administratively simple and to show that it works on 
paper, just evaluating some effects that are esteemed to be 
worthy. Most of the time the budget costs are taken into account 
by economists, mainly for two reasons I suppose: 1) the level of 
budget costs seems to be favourite among politicians in this dec-
ade: the lower the better without discussion where the money is 
spent onI 2) for economists, it is relatively simple to calculate 
these costs, while the effects on farmers and consumers income 
are more difficult and questionable. 
In this study I will try to give an integral picture of the 
consequences of two policy scenarios. The effect of the Maximum 
Guaranteed Quantities (MGQ's) for cereals, oilseeds and protein 
crops introduced in 1988 are evaluated against the background of 
these policy scenarios. The set-aside programme will be discussed 
and analyzed in the same setting, and we will go into the possi-
bilities of extensifing agricultural production. The study will 
be closed with a discussion about crop production in the EC, tak-
ing into account future international and technological develop-
ments and conclusions about a desirable EC cereal policy. 
2. Some exercises in EC cereal policy 1) 
2.1 Figures from the past: market and prices 
The 1989 EC cereal production will be about 160 million tons 
(The Commission decided 160.5 million tons), equal to that in 
1985 and not very different from the levels in the years in be-
tween. Meanwhile, the number of hectares has declined, except in 
the last year. From the historical point of view, the EC cereal 
production seems to be rather stable. 
During the last twenty years, the cereal yields have in-
creased at about 2.3 to 2.6 percent a year in the EC-9. This is 
the combined result of farmers shifting their cropping plan from 
rye, barley and oats to higher-yielding wheat and maize and in-
creased input of nitrogen and agrochemicals. 
During the eighties, the area of cereals in the EC-9 de-
clined by about 2 million hectares (8Z), from more than 27 mil-
lion hectares to 25 million hectares, due to changes in the agri-
cultural policy for the arable sector. For cereals there was a 
restrictive price regime, and the oilseeds and protein crops were 
stimulated. 
The internal market for cereals has shown a remarkable sta-
bility in the last fifteen years: about 110 million tons in the 
EC-9 and 140 million tons in the EC-12. The human consumption, 
industrial uses and seed categories show little variation. On the 
other hand, the demand from the feed sector shows variation, 
mainly caused by world market developments: prices and the ECU/ 
Dollar exchange rate. Since 1984, the ECU price of maize on the 
world market has declined by more than 50 percent. This is enough 
to nullify the positive effect of decreased EC cereal prices, 
during these years, on their competitive strength in the EC feed 
market. But in effect the impact is even worse than that, because 
the EC lost about 8 million tons in the EC feed market. 
Since the beginning of the seventies, the real prices for 
cereals and total crop production have declined as the figures In 
table 2.1 show. These figures indicate that there are differences 
between countries and that wheat prices declined slightly more 
than those for barley. But this difference in price development 
between both cereals is certainly not enough to stop the trend 
from shifting from barley to wheat, because yields per hectare 
grew much faster for wheat. 
1) This part of the article is based on Blom (1988a). 
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Table 2.1 Price developments of crop production, wheat and bar-
ley in the member states of the EC-9. Index: 1980*100 
Tear Country 
1973 
1983 
1987 
1373 
1983 
1987 
B DR D F IRL I NL UK 
CROP PRODUCTION a) 
126.5 
110.5 
86.1 
120.7 
102.0 
79.2 
106.8 120.5 120.5 116.1 
92.9 99.9 85.4 92.1 
80.7 83.1 66.6 82.6 
123.1 
100.0 
89.7 
130.1 
107.9 
85.7 
WHEAT RELATIVE TO CROP PRODUCTION b) 
102.9 
94.3 
94.2 
97.8 
96.0 
86.6 
111.3 102.8 139.5 101.6 
98.7 96.6 109.5 95.5 
86.8 90.4 106.1 83.2 
110.1 
99.7 
83.8 
104.1 
92.0 
84.6 
BARLEY RELATIVE TO CROP PRODUCTION c) 
1973 104.0 97.6 111.8 101.9 118.8 105.9 103.9 98.5 
1983 99.6 98.3 100.1 100.4 111.9 97.4 104.4 93.6 
1987 98.6 92.5 88.7 88.8 98.8 87.7 89.9 88.4 
a) Index»(price index crop production)/(consumer price index); 
b) Index-(price index wheat)/(price index crop production); 
c) Index-(price index barley)/(price index crop production). 
In the period 1973/1983, real cereal prices remained in bal-
ance with the prices for total crop production. Prices for crop 
production as a whole declined by about 2.5 percent per annum 
during this period. From 1983 onwards, cereal prices declined 
more than the rest of crop production. Real cereal prices have 
decreased by 3 to 3.5 percent a year from 1973 to 1987; this im-
plies that since 1983 real cereal prices have declined by about 
5 percent per year. 
The consequences of an ever-increasing EC cereal production 
and a stable internal demand are reflected in the EC cereal trade 
balance and the EC grain stocks (see table 2.2). Net cereal ex-
port of the EC-9 increased by 30 million tons in eleven years, 
and during the same period the internal cereal stock Increased by 
10 million tons. The latter fact is certainly not alarming if we 
take into account that the EC has become an Important exporter of 
cereals. In that position the EC should be a reliable supplier of 
cereals and therefore a higher level of stocks is in accordance 
with this new role. 
Table 2.2 Het EC cereal exports; x 1000 tons 
Cereal EC-9 EC-12 
1975/76 1979/80 1986/87 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 
Wheat 
Coarse gr. 
Total 
2 
-11 
- 8 
357 
350 
993 
6 152 
-5 886 
266 
NET EXPORT 
14 386 7 240 
7 905 19 760 
22 273 27 000 
6 370 
19 630 
26 000 
4 
31 
36 
070 
930 
000 
STOCKS 
Wheat 
Coarse gr. 
Total 
7 900 8 200 12 100 
5 100 5 100 11 700 
13 000 13 300 23 800 
16 400 16 200 
15 100 12 600 
31 500 28 800 
Sources: Eurostat, crop production; Commission FAO, FOOD OUTLOOK 
(stock data for the EC-12). 
2.2 Figures from the past: production structure 
In 1983 the EC-10 had 6.5 million agricultural enterprises. 
On 4.6 million of these farms (72 Z) there was some crop produc-
tion. Cereal production was reported on 3.4 million farms 
(Eurostat, Farm Structure, Survey 1983). The number of special-
ized arable farms was not more than 1.4 million. 
These figures make it clear that cereal production is a 
verywide spread activity in European agriculture. That means that 
any change in the EC cereal policy touches nearly the whole agri-
cultural sector. This feature of European agriculture is often 
overlooked by outsiders when they advocate a two price system for 
the EC (cf. Gorter & Mellke, 1987). While the figures show that 
many farmers are involved in cereal production, a relatively 
small number are responsible for the bulk of the cereals pro-
duced, as is shown in table 2.3. 
About 25 percent of the largest farms with cereals in the 
cropping plan have 75 percent of the cereal area. If we take into 
account that 55 percent of the cereal area on smaller farms is 
found in Greece and Italy with much lower yields than in the 
Northern countries of the EC, it will be clear that more than 
80 percent of the cereal production comes from the 25 percent 
largest farms. It seems plausible to assume that about ten per-
cent of the largest farms with cereals produce 50 percent of all 
cereals in the EC. Eighty percent of this production is located 
in three countries: UK, France and Italy (North). 
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Table 2.3 Distribution of farm enterprises and the area of cer-
eals according to farm size classes; EC-10, 1983 
Farm size class 
< 5 hect. 
5 to 20 ,, 
20 to 50 ,, 
50 to 100 ,, 
> 100 ,, 
Total 
< 4 ESU *) 
4 to 16 ,, 
16 to 40 ,, 
> 40 
Total 
Enterprises 
number 
x 1000 
1 433 
1 110 
616 
207 
83 
3 449 
1 420 
1 120 
632 
278 
3 450 
X 
41.5 
32.2 
17.9 
6.0 
2.4 
100.0 
41.2 
32.5 
18.3 
8.1 
100.0 
cum. X 
41.5 
73.7 
91.6 
97.6 
100.0 
41.2 
73.7 
92.0 
100.0 
number 
x 1000 
1 629 
5 065 
7 403 
5 845 
7 210 
27 152 
1 969 
5 258 
7 809 
12 078 
27 114 
Hectares 
% 
6.0 
18.7 
27.3 
21.5 
26.6 
100.0 
7.3 
19.4 
28.8 
44.5 
100.0 
cum. Z 
6.0 
24.7 
52.0 
73.5 
100.0 
7.3 
26.7 
55.5 
100.0 
*) ESU (European Size Unit) - 1000 ECU Gross Standard Margin. 
Twenty to forty percent of the smaller farmers (< 20 hec-
tares) have additional income from outside agriculture; especial-
ly those younger than 55 years (40 to 50 percent). 
There is still another characteristic of the production 
structure relevant for policy-makers : more than 20 percent of the 
European farmers are older than 65 years and about 50 percent 
older than 55 years (1983). This means that many farmers will 
have to decide within a few years about the continuation of their 
enterprise. 
Many farms are too small to generate an income, as table 2.3 
shows. Of course the minimum acceptable size will depend on the 
reference income in the region where the farm is located; it will 
be different in the South of Italy compared to the North of Ger-
many. But nevertheless it is reasonable to expect that the number 
of farms will decrease remarkably in the next decade (30 to 
40 percent). 
The majority of agricultural enterprises are located in Less 
Favoured Areas (LFA's): 62 percent in 1983 in the EC-10. It is 
estimated that no more than 15 percent of the cereal production 
comes from LFA's (28 percent of the cereal area). Direct income 
support is already possible in these areas. 
In short we can conclude that a relatively small number of 
farmers produce more than 80 percent of all cereals; that the 
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modal EC farmer is more than fifty-five years old; thirty to 
forty percent of the younger farmers have an additional income 
from sources other than agriculture and the majority of farmers 
live in LFA's. 
At first sight, these figures seem to be alarming if we 
think about the competitiveness of the EC in a world market per-
spective. But if unit costs per ton of wheat in the EC are com-
pared with those in the USA, there is no reason for pessimism 
(Commission, 1985; Stanton & Neville Rolfe, 1986). The UK, Den-
mark and also Ireland and France seem to have lower or equal cost 
prices for wheat as farmers in the USA. Of course this position 
is dependent on the ECU/Dollar exchange rate, but with an ex-
change rate of 1.0 the larger EC cereal producers are capable of 
competing with the USA wheat producers. On top of this, the EC 
has the advantage of a more favourable location. Wheat from the 
USA has to be transported over long distances before it can be 
exported, while the EC farmers in Northern Europe are at a 
shorter distance from sea-ports. 
The story is quite different for coarse grains. The unit 
costs for maize in the USA are 80 to 90 ECU per ton, while the 
costs of production for barley (the most Important feed grain in 
the EC) are 120 to 125 ECU per ton in the UK. This means that the 
EC will only have a natural protection in this market as long as 
transport costs are at least 40 to 45 ECU per ton. This is also 
the main reason, further stimulated by the CAP, for the large im-
ports of so-called cereal substitutes by the EC. These concen-
trates have to compete with maize in the world market or barley/ 
wheat in the EC. We can even conclude that the CAP, with high 
threshold prices for coarse grains and no protection for cereal 
substitutes such as cassava and corn-gluten feed, has undermined 
the competitive strength of EC agriculture. As a consequence of 
this policy, the EC demanded less coarse grains, which, ceteris 
paribus, has resulted in lower prices for maize on the world mar-
ket. This has stimulated the trade in and even production of cer-
eal substitutes. Supplies that would otherwise have never ap-
peared, have been created outside the EC. 
2.3 The consequences of an unchanged trend 
What will be the effect of ever increasing yields for cer-
eals while the internal market is stagnant? Some simple calcula-
tions are presented to indicate the consequences. These calcula-
tions have been made for a period of ten years, starting in 1987, 
on the following assumptions: 
there will be 35.3 million hectares of cereals In the EC-12; 
the yields Increase at 2.6 percent per annum; 
the internal market is 140 million tons; 
net exports are constant at a level of 20 million tons; 
the storage costs for cereals are 25 ECU per ton a year. 
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Table 2.4 The consequences of an unchanged development for the 
EC cereal sector during the period 1987-1997; EC-12 
1987 1990 1995 1997 
Production (mill, tons) 
Import ,, 
Int. Demand ,, 
Export ,, 
Change in Stock ,, 
Opening Stock ,, 
Storage costs (mill. ECUs) 
Surplus area (1 000 hect.) *) 
166 
5 
140 
25 
6 
25 
625 
1 438 
1 
3 
180 
5 
140 
25 
20 
58 
463 
941 
5 
7 
204 
5 
140 
25 
44 
207 
180 
724 
215 
5 
140 
25 
55 
302 
7 553 
9 100 
*) Surplus area • Change in Stock/Average Yield per Hectare. 
The results appear in table 2.4. The production« according 
to these calculations, will be 215 million tons in 1997, and 
stocks will increase by more than 50 million tons per year. If 
nothing is done, stocks will increase to over 300 million tons in 
1997, but the costs will be prohibitive (7.5 milliard ECU). To 
prevent this, 7.9 million hectares of average-quality land should 
be taken away from arable farming (10Z of total arable land). 
Taking into account that the less fertile soils are taken away 
from production, it may be necessary to find alternative uses for 
15 percent of all arable land. 
2.4 Two different price scenarios and the consequences 
The central element in the current EC cereal policy is to 
lower prices of cereals and other arable crops. Also, the recent-
ly Introduced Maximum Guaranteed Quantities are just a more in-
stitutionalized way to lower these prices (see section 3). In 
this section we will trace the impact of price reductions. After 
a short Introduction of the model used and the main assumptions 
of the study, the effects on supply, demand, prices and cereal 
stocks as well as on farmers' income, consumers' welfare and the 
EC budget are evaluated. 
2.4.1 The model and the assumptions 
The results presented in this section are mainly generated 
with the Cereal and Compound Feed Raw Material Market Model (CCM 
Model). This hybrid market model has been developed by the author 
within the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI-DLO), 
The Hague. The current model was built in the beginning of the 
eighties and contains only the EC-9 countries. A new version for 
the EC-12 is available since 1990. The CCM-model is a policy 
simulation model. The results should not be seen as a forecast 
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but as a reliable and consistent way of evaluating policy scen-
arios . 
On the supply side, the development of the total area of 
arable land is based on a recent trend (+ 0.11Z per annum during 
1983-1986). Changes in the cropping plan of year t are, in the 
model, determined by changes in the Gross Revenues per hectare in 
year t-1. The cropping plan is determined in two steps with the 
help of a translog production function (cf. Chrlstensen et al., 
1973). In the first step, the land is allocated to the main cat-
egories of arable crops: cereals, potatoes, sugar-beet, oilseeds, 
fodder crops and the remaining (e.g. protein) crops. The assumed 
supply elasticity for cereals is 0.5 and in the eighties there is 
evidence for the EC-9 that this level is realistic. In the second 
step, the cereal area is allocated to the different cereals: soft 
wheat, rye, barley, oats, maize and the remaining cereals (e.g. 
durum wheat). The supply elasticity of wheat is assumed to be 
1.0. The other price and cross-price elasticities are derived 
from these two elasticities in a consistent way. 
On the demand side, four outlet categories are distin-
guished: direct human consumption, feed, industry and seed. The 
feed category consists of two separate outlets: direct use on the 
farm or on another farm and use in compound feed. Table 2.5 shows 
the importance of each category. 
Table 2.5 Internal cereal demand by outlet category; EC-12; 
1988189; (mill, tons) 
Outlet category 
losses human industry feed seed total 
cons. 
direct compound 
Demand 0.9 36.4 10.4 51.3 31.0 5.4 135.4 
The demand functions for all categories, except the compound 
feed industry, are of a log-linear type, and the volume depends 
on the price, the price of substitutes, the prices of other goods 
and services and income development (cf. Deaton & Muelbauer, 
1980; the Stonemodel). The demand for cereals by the compound 
feed industry is simulated with the help of linear programming 
models (LP models) for 19 different regions in the EC-9 and nine 
types of compound feed per region: 3 for cattle, 3 for pigs, 3 
for poultry. The compound feed sector produces 100 million tons 
of compound feed per year (EC-12) and the input of cereals is 
31 million tons (see table 2.5). This is the only cereal outlet 
in the EC that is highly sensitive to price changes. 
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Cereals 
Potatoes 
Sugar beet 
Industrial crops a) 
Fodder crops 
Remaining crops b) 
-2.50 
-2.25 
-2.75 
-3.00 
c) 
-2.00 
World market prices are assumed to decrease by 2.5 percent 
per year during the period considered and the ECU/Dollar exchange 
rate is kept constant at the October 1987 level (1.15). The fore-
casts for the development of the EC population is according to 
Eurostat figures (Review, 1976-1985). Real per capita income of 
European citizens is assumed to increase at one percent per year. 
The EC cereal prices are determined by the Commission and 
are therefore exogenous to the model. Furthermore, assumptions 
were made about price development for other arable crops. 
Table 2.6 illustrates two price scenarios. 
Table 2.6 Assumptions concerning price developments for arable 
crops; Z per annum 
Crop Base Run Policy Market Oriented Policy 
-4.50 
-3.75 
-4.00 
-4.00 
d) 
-3.00 
a) Mainly oilseeds; b) Mainly protein crops; c) Gross Revenues 
0Z; d) Gross Revenues -2Z. 
The yield increases for the different agricultural crops are 
based on historical trends. For cereals this figure is about 
2.5 percent per annum. For the other crops it is: potatoes 2.0Z; 
sugar-beet and pulses 2.5Z; and oilseeds 3Z per year. Under the 
BRP the Gross Revenues remain more or less unchanged. 
2.4.2 The consequences for the cereal market 
The consequences for cereal supply and demand of the BRP and 
MOP scenario are shown in table 2.7. Under the assumptions of the 
BRP, the forecasts for cereal supply are 15 million ton lower 
than those presented in table 2.4 (unchanged development). The 
projected increases in cereal stocks are also lower under the BRP 
scenario than the former projections. This is also caused by an 
increased demand for cereals by the feed sector in the Southern 
countries of the EC (Spain) as a consequence of an increasing 
demand for intensive livestock products. It is not a result of a 
higher proportion of cereals in compound feed, because EC cereals 
prices decreased under this scenario as much as those in the 
world market. 
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If cereal prices are decreased by 4.5 percent per annum« ce-
real supply will be about 5 million tons lower in 1996/97 com-
pared to the BRP scenario. As a consequence of increasing the 
proportion of cereals in compound feed« total demand for cereals 
increases with 6.2 million tons compared to the BRP scenario. 
This substitution resulted from slight changes in the price rela-
tionship between cereals and other compound feed raw materials 
(see section 2.4.4). The cereal stock will increase much less as 
a consequence of a lower supply and an increased demand, but 
there remains a surplus. Even under the MOP scenario, the cereal 
stock will be about 125 million tons in 1996/97. If this policy 
decreases the number of hectares of arable land, the effect on 
the balance sheet will even be more significant. 
Table 2.7 Supply and Disappearances of cereals under the BRP and 
HDP scenario (million tons) 
Supply 
Hectares (mill.) 
Yield (ton/hect) 
Production 
Demand 
Consumption 
Industry 
Seed 
Feed 
Net export 
Losses 
Total demand 
Change in Stock 
Opening Stock 
1988/89 
34.8 
4.8 
167.0 
36.2 
10.4 
5.5 
87.3 
20.0 
2.0 
161.4 
— 
25.0 
BRI 
1991/92 
34.5 
5.2 
178.3 
36.1 
10.3 
5.4 
90.2 
20.0 
2.0 
164.0 
14.3 
63.1 
> 
1996/97 
34.1 
5.9 
200.4 
35.9 
10.3 
5.3 
94.3 
20.0 
2.0 
167.8 
32.6 
183.0 
MOP 
1991/92 
34.0 
5.2 
175.9 
36.1 
10.4 
5.3 
93.7 
20.0 
2.0 
167.5 
8.4 
53.1 
1 
1996/97 
33.3 
5.9 
194.9 
36.0 
10.3 
5.1 
101.0 
20.0 
2.0 
174.0 
20.5 
124.6 
2.4.3 The effect on supply of other arable crops 
As the cereal area decreased slightly, other arable crops 
have become more important, because the total number of hectares 
arable land did not decrease. The effect on the production of 
other arable crops is shown in table 2.8. 
Given the assumed price development for potatoes and sugar-
beet, the production will be stable or decline slightly. This is 
in accordance with the quota regulation for the sugar market and 
the very inelastic demand for potatoes. Both oilseeds and protein 
crop production increase substantially. The consequences for the 
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budget are evaluated In section 2.4.7 and the Impact of the MGQ's 
is discussed in section 3. 
Table 2.8 The arable production under the BRP and MOP scenarios 
1987 Index: 1987-100 
mill, ton 
BRP MOP 
1991 1996 1991 1996 
Potatoes 40.5 98.8 92.1 95.9 86.6 
Sugar-beet 97.0 95.2 84.6 101.8 106.1 
Oilseeds 10.0 109.5 127.6 114.6 143.3 
Pulses 3.5 130.0 194.1 147.8 244.3 
2.4.4 Price development for arable crops and concentrate feed 
As a result of the assumed policy scenarios, all prices for 
arable crops decline. In the concentrate feed market, EC cereals 
compete with imported concentrates. When EC cereal prices go 
down, prices of these concentrates will also decline. The extent 
to which this will happen is simulated with the CCM model. 
In 1996/97, real prices will be 20 to 25 percent below those 
in 1987 under the BRP scenario. If the MOP scenario is followed, 
real prices will be 25 to 35 percent lower than in 1987. In The 
Netherlands, wheat prices will fall from 163 ECU in 1987 to 
128 ECU in 1996/97 under the BRP scenario and to 105 ECU in case 
of the MOP. Table 2.9 shows price indices for different arable 
crops in 1991/92 and 1996/97. 
Table 2.9 Price Indices for arable crops under the BRP and MOP 
scenario (1987/88-100) 
Crop BRP MOP 
Cereals 
Potatoes 
Sugar-beet 
Oilseeds 
Pulses 
1991/92 
90 
91 
89 
88 
92 
1996/97 
78 
82 
78 
76 
83 
1991/92 
82 
86 
85 
85 
89 
1996/97 
64 
71 
69 
69 
76 
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It was assumed that world market prices for cereals (and 
other concentrates) decrease by 2.5 percent per annum in the 
period considered. So, ceteris paribus, in 1996/97 world market 
prices are 80 percent of their 1987 level. Table 2.10 shows the 
prices for some concentrates as simulated by the CCM model. 
From these results it can be concluded that in the BRP scen-
ario all cereal substitutes show a price development similar to 
EC cereal prices. It appears also that soya meal prices develop 
independent of the EC cereal prices. The HOP scenario makes this 
tendency even more clear. But from this scenario it can also be 
concluded that cereal substitute prices do not follow the EC 
price developments totally. These comparatively small changes in 
relative prices will result in an increased cereal use in the 
compound feed industry. On the other hand, it stresses the huge 
influence of the ECU/Dollar exchange rate in this volatile mar-
ket. 
Table 2.10 Price indices for some concentrates under the BRP and 
MOP scenarios 1987188-100 
Concentrate BRP MOP 
Soya meal 
Corn Gluten Feed 
Tapioca 
Citrus pulp 
Wheat bran 
1991/92 
92 
89 
90 
89 
90 
1996/97 
81 
77 
79 
77 
79 
1991/92 
91 
85 
85 
87 
85 
1996/97 
80 
68 
70 
72 
73 
2.A.5 Agricultural income 
Price decreases on the scale as under the MOP scenario will 
leave no farmer unaffected. With the help of information from the 
Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN, 1983/84) the effects on the 
net value added of different farm types were calculated. Only the 
effects of price decreases for the arable products were evalu-
ated, with the following formula: 
NVA1/NVA0 - GRA1/NVA0 * {(GRA1/GRA0) - 1} + 1 (2.1) 
where: 
NVA1 - Net Value Added in period 1 
GRA1 - Gross Revenues from the Arable sector in period 1 
The initial values for NVA0 and GRA0 come from FADN and the 
index GRAl/GRAO is a result from the translog production func-
tion. The final result (NVA1/NVA0) is an index for the develop-
ment of the net value added for a certain farm type. As can be 
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seen from the formula, farms with relatively a small proportion 
arable crops will be, ceteris paribus, less effected by decreas-
ing prices. (GRAO/NVAO will be relatively small). This Is also 
the case for farms with a relatively high net value added. 
To calculate these Income consequences, we made the heroic 
assumption that all costs will remain equal In real terms to 
those In the base period (1983/84). This Is true, as volumes do 
not change and price Increases are equal to the Inflation. The 
results of this exercise appear In figure 2.1. Only the effects 
of the MOP scenario are shown, because the negative Income ef-
fects of the BRP scenario are negligible and are therefore not 
reported. 
Of course the more specialized arable farms face greater 
losses than the mixed types. Farmers In the UK will have a 
stronger position than those In France, Italy and Germany. The 
Dutch arable farms seem also to be competitive, but this Is main-
ly caused by their strong position In the potato market. The spe-
cialized cereal farmers In the Metherlands (about 400) are not 
represented In the FÂDN, but they will certainly show a loss of 
net value added of more than 30 percent. Denmark seems to have a 
weak position In the specialized arable sector. On the other hand 
their position is strong in the mixed livestock sector. 
Farm type 
11 Cereals 
12 0th.arable 
43 Mixed dairy 
62 Mixed arable 
81 M.ar./pasture 
82 M.ar./oth.an. 
Z Decrease of 
0-15 15-30 
UK 
B,NL,IRL,UK 
B,DK,F,UK,D I 
B.UK 
B,DK IRL,NL,F,I,D 
DK B,NL,F,UK 
NVA 
>30 
DK,D,F,IKL,I 
DK,D,F,I 
DK,D,F,I 
D 
Figure 2.1 EC-member countries, devlded according to the measure 
of decrease of net value added on farms with more 
than 2 hectares of cereals HOP scenario; 1996197 com-
pared to the 1987/88 situation 
The presented results may give too pessimistic a picture of 
what will really happen, because the model does not take into ac-
count that about one third of all farm enterprises will be ended 
during the period evaluated. From 1975 to 1983 the average number 
of hectares per farm increased by one percent per annum. If, as a 
consequence of the MOP scenario, this rate of increase rises to 
1.5 percent it is expected that the net value added will undergo 
a positive effect of in the order of 15 to 25 percent in this 
19 
period. It is assumed that fixed costs, except those for land, 
remain unchanged and that the variable costs will increase pro-
portionally. 
Nevertheless, net value added decreases seriously throughout 
the whole arable sector and fanners who have to pay rent on land, 
interest on borrowed capital and wages for hired labour are most 
vulnerable to a MOP scenario. The average solvency rate of arable 
farmers is high (70 to nearly 100 percent) in all EC countries 
except Denmark. In Denmark this figure is 55 to 65 percent for 
specialized arable farms and cereal farms respectively. Logical-
ly, it might be expected that especially the younger fanners will 
have a less favourable solvency compared to the average. 
2.4.6 Positive income effects 
Due to the MOP scenario arable farmers are confronted with 
income losses, but consumers and other users of arable products 
pay less as a consequence of lower prices. The positive income 
effects have been calculated in the following way: 
J 
II - 0.5 I (PO -P1)*(Q1 +Q0) 2.2 
j-l 
where: 
PI is the price of product j in period 1 
Ql is the volume of product j in period 1 
II is the income effect in period 1 
j»l,...,J are cereals, potatoes, sugar-beet, oilseeds, 
pulses and compound feed (as far as it is non-cer-
eals) . 
The results appear in table 2.11. 
Table 2.11 Coats reduction and positive income effects as conse-
quences of the BRP and MOP scenarios. Figures com-
pared to the 1987188 situations (mill. ECU) 
BRP 
1991/92 
1996/97 
MOP 
1991/92 
1996/97 
Seed 
(a) 
143 
287 
235 
465 
Peed 
(b) 
2466 
5212 
3869 
7982 
Remain.int. 
use(c) 
2429 
5050 
3666 
7503 
Sub total 
(d-b+c) 
4895 
10262 
7535 
15485 
Met export 
(e) 
128 
353 
409 
1293 
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A small part of the positive effects revert to the arable 
sector as lower seed prices. Most of the lower feed prices will 
be transferred to the consumer, as prices for meat and eggs will 
be decreased. So the sub-total(d) gives a reliable indication of 
the positive income effects for the European consumer. Therefore 
we conclude that the consumer will gain about 10 to 15 milliard 
ECU per year in 1996/97 under the BRP and MOP scenario respect-
ively. Some of the positive effects will appear as lower budget 
costs as the export restitutions on cereals will decrease. This 
is one of the effects reported under net export. The net export 
effect is also positively influenced by lower prices for Imported 
oilseeds. 
2.4.7 The EC budget for the agricultural sector 
The last effect we have to take into account is the effect 
on the EC budget. Prices have been decreased, cereal production 
has increased and oilseeds and protein crops have increased their 
share. What is the total Impact of those different effects on the 
EC budget? An overview of the main results is given in 
table 2.12. 
It has to be concluded that under none of the simulated pol-
icies will the budget costs be reduced. This is mainly caused by 
the huge cereal stocks that are created. Therefore the total 
budget costs for cereals will Increase substantially. The outlays 
for oilseeds remain more or less constant even while production 
has increased by 30 to 40 percent. The budget costs for protein 
crops will increase by 65 to 75 percent from a relatively low 
level. The production of these crops increases by 100 to 150 per-
cent. 
Table 2.12 Budget costs for the arable sector under BSP and HOP 
scenario} (mill. ECU) 
Cereals *) 
of which: 
Exp.rest. 
Storage 
Oilseeds 
Pulses 
Total 
1987/88 
2690 
2925 
625 
4044 
422 
7156 
BRI 
1991/92 
3468 
2665 
1578 
3859 
510 
7837 
> 
1996/97 
6255 
2355 
4575 
3847 
706 
10808 
MOI 
1991/92 
2993 
2350 
1328 
3828 
534 
7355 
• 
1996/97 
4410 
1790 
3115 
3766 
742 
8918 
*) Cereals - exp.rest. + storage costs - import levies. 
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2.4.8 Some preliminary conclusions 
The exercises show that a reduction of cereal prices reduces 
but does not solve the surplus problem. It seems unrealistic to 
expect a stabilization of the cereal production or an expansion 
of demand that Is large enough to absorb the increased produc-
tion. 
The MOP scenario might be seen as a continuation of the EC 
cereal policy from 1985 to the introduction of MGQ's for the ma-
jor arable crops. This policy will result in a rapidly increasing 
production of oilseeds and protein crops. Under the assumed scen-
ario, the budget costs for these crops increase only slightly. 
The income effects of the MOP scenario for the arable sector 
are considerably negative. This will make it politically diffi-
cult to continue such a policy if no additional measures are 
taken. Taking into account that the EC consumers will face huge 
benefits in absolute terms from the MOP scenario, it seems rea-
sonable to raise funds for additional measures. 
22 
3. The consequences of the MGQ's 
The EC introduced Maximum Guaranteed Quantities for the 
first time in crop year 1988/89. The regulation implies that 
prices will be lowered in this (oilseeds or protein crops) or the 
next year (cereals) when production is higher than the MGQ. An 
overview of the regulation is given in table 3.1. 
If more than 160 million ton cereals are produced, the in-
tervention price for cereals will be decreased by 3 percent in 
the next year. In the year they exceed the MGQ, an extra co-re-
sponsibility levy has to be paid of the same order as the MGQ is 
exceeded to a maximum of three percent. The prices of oilseeds 
and protein crops are decreased by 0.5 percent for every percent 
higher production than the MGQ in the same year as the MGQ is ex-
ceeded. 
Turning the argument around, we can state that the following 
quantities of oilseeds and protein crops might be produced in 
1991, given the realized price reductions (see table 3.2). 
Table 3.1 MGQ 
Crop 
Cereals 
Oilseeds 
Rape 
Sunflower 
Soya beans 
Protein crops 
regulation 
MGQ 
(mill, tons) 
160.0 (EC-12) 
4.5 (EC-10) 
2.0 (EC-10) 
1.3 (EC-12) 
3.5 (EC-12) 
Penalty 
31 n.y. (1) 
0.5Z (2) 
0.5Z (2) 
0.5Z (2) 
0.5Z (2) 
Period 
1988/89-1991/92 
1988/89-1990/91 
» » » » 
i > 1 1 
it » » 
Table 3.2 Admitted production of oilseeds and protein crops un-
der the BKP and MOP scenario; 1991 , x 1000 tons *) 
CROP BRP MOP 
Oilseeds 
Rape 
Sunflower 
Soya 
Protein crops 
5535 
2460 
1600 
4050 
5860 
2600 
1700 
4300 
*) Calculations are based on the price reductions shown in 
table 2.9. 
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Those figures are generally lower than the production simu-
lated with the model. So the introduction of the MGQ's for oil-
seeds and protein crops will result in a smaller production than 
simulated. The production of potatoes, sugar-beet and fodder 
crops will not expand for well known reasons. Potato prices will 
decrease severely when supply is increased and there is a quota 
system for sugar and milk, therefore production will not be ex-
panded. 
If the production of oilseeds and protein crops are at the 
levels reported in table 3.2, about 1 million hectares of arable 
land will return to cereal production. Cereal production will be 
about 5 million tons higher in 1991/92 than reported in 
table 2.7. It can therefore be concluded that after the introduc-
tion of MGQ's in the arable sector, there are no crops left for 
arable farmers to escape from ever-decreasing cereal prices. 
A second conclusion can be that the EC has implicitly chosen 
to expand its production of cereals instead of oilseeds and pro-
tein crops, which will have serious international implications as 
more and more cereals have to be exported unless other outlets 
(bio-ethanol) or acreage reduction are realized. 
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4. Set-aside: a solution to surpluses? 
From the exercise in section 2 it was concluded that even a 
very restrictive price policy will not result in a reasonable 
market equilibrium. One way to cope with the ever-growing surplus 
is the recently introduced set-aside regulation. In most of the 
member states, the regulation was introduced in the crop year 
1988/89. Germany had already had some experience before the regu-
lation was Imposed upon the member states by the EC. 
In general, the set-aside scheme aims to withdraw arable 
land from surplus crops. Farmers can choose between different op-
tions: fallow or green fallow, with different set-aside premiums. 
They have to sign a contract for at least five years and a mini-
mum of 20 percent of the eligible area should be brought under 
the scheme. 
In 1988, the first year of the set-aside regulation, less 
than 0.5 million hectares were fallowed under the set-aside 
scheme, of which 170,000 hectares in Germany and 150,000 hectares 
in Italy. This poor result can be explained by the late introduc-
tion of the regulation and the fact that farmers have no experi-
ence with such a regulation. With respect to the latter argument, 
social acceptability will play an Important role. 
Another reason is the relatively low premiums offered to 
farmers. That raises the question of what should be paid to a 
farmer to make the set-aside scheme attractive? Of course that is 
the amount of money a farmers forgoes if he does not produce the 
crop that would otherwise be produced. This will depend on the 
Gross Revenues of this crop and the costs the farmer will save by 
not producing it. The difficulty with the question is twofold: 
1) what type of costs will be saved? and 2) what is the level of 
these costs and the Gross Revenues? 
By definition, the variable costs are saved if a crop is not 
produced. This means that there are no outlays for seed, ferti-
lizers and chemicals. Also, the Interest on the working capital 
is not forgone. But as small farmers will hire a contractor for 
some activities, especially harvesting, the larger farmer will do 
it on his own. For this reason the Gross Margin will be higher on 
larger farms than on small ones. 
Sometimes it will be possible to save some of the fixed 
costs, e.g. on very large farms where a combine harvester is in-
tensively used the depreciation and maintenance costs will be 
somewhat less. It might also be possible to save on hired labour. 
On the other hand, depreciation and maintenance costs on bulld-
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ings and overhead costs, e.g. specific taxes on land, will remain 
unchanged. So It Is certainly not possible to save on all fixed 
costs. 
Looking from the perspective of opportunity costs of the 
different production factors Is another approach that uay explain 
the level of the set-aside premium. Capital, labour and land 
might have other possibilities for exploitation. Under the vari-
able costs we take Into account the Interest on the working capi-
tal, and no other capital will become available as a consequence 
of taking part In the set-aside scheme. As far as hired labour Is 
concerned, this factor Is taken Into account under the variable 
costs (contractor) or the fixed costs. If the farmer or his wife 
have a possibility to find off-farm work and can spend more hours 
on that as a consequence of taking part In the set-aside scheme, 
they will compare these earnings with the money foregone. Also, 
an older farmer who prefers to work less will calculate a high 
marginal earning for the extra hours saved by not producing. 
These farmers will be prepared to accept a somewhat lower set-
aside premium. The opportunity costs for the land are very low In 
most cases, because the farmer Is not allowed to use it for many 
other crops. If he may use it, e.g. green fallow, the premium 
will be lower. One of the exceptions Is forestry. But that is a 
rather radical change from a farmer's point of view, and it has 
to be done in a longer term perspective than the five year period 
of the set-aside scheme (Blom et al., 1989). A drawback of for-
estry in some cases, especially in the Netherlands, is that the 
area no longer takes part in the rotation scheme. 
We can conclude from this discussion that the Gross Margin 
can be seen as an upper limit for the premiums to pay. The level 
of the Gross Margin is influenced by the organization of the 
farm. Ceteris paribus, the smaller farms will have lower Gross 
Margins as a consequence of hiring contractors. In general, the 
net value added will be too low as a premium level, because only 
on the very large farms will it be possible to save some of the 
fixed costs by taking part in the set-aside scheme. The opportun-
ity to find off-farm work will play a minor role in the decision 
to take part in the set-aside scheme, as well as the possibil-
ities to use the land for other purposes. 
To determine the necessary levels of a set-aside premium, we 
have calculated Gross Margins for wheat and barley for the dif-
ferent EC member states on the basis of two sources: costs prices 
for these cereals (Commission, 1985) and FADN data. The informa-
tion was updated to 1987. The Gross Margin could easily be de-
rived from the costs prices. On the other hand it is more complex 
if FADN data are used, as direct costs per hectare were calcu-
lated and subtracted from the Gross Revenues. This means that not 
only direct costs on cereals are taken into account. To minimize 
this fault we derived the Gross Margin from 'cereal type' arable 
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farms only. But this leaves us with errors from not using the di-
rect costs for the different cereals, because in general direct 
costs for wheat are higher than those for barley. The results are 
therefore biased: Gross Margins for wheat will be too high and 
those for barley too low. 
The Gross Margins as calculated on the basis of both sources 
as well as the set-aside premiums for the first year (1988/89) 
appear in table 4.1. In general, the Gross Margins calculated on 
the basis of costs prices are higher than those from the FADN 
data. This can be caused by the fact that we took average direct 
costs and subtracted these from the Gross Revenues for wheat and 
barley respectively. Because the remaining crops such as potatoes 
and sugar-beet will have higher direct costs, the Gross Margin 
can be calculated too low. Nevertheless, the results from both 
sources correspond reasonably well, and we should keep in mind 
that the variation in the Gross Margin within and between farms 
is considerable. 
The gap between the set-aside premium and the Gross Margin 
seems to be large in countries such as Belgium, Denmark, France 
and possibly the UK. Germany and Italy offer a premium that is 
close to or even higher than the Gross Margin. Both countries re-
ported a substantial area brought under the set-aside scheme. For 
the crop year 1989/90 premiums will be raised in some countries: 
France + 25 Z and in the Netherlands to the maximum admitted level 
of 700 ECU per hectare. 
Table 4.1 Gross Margins for wheat and barley and set-aside pre-
miums per hectare In ECU's for the EC member states 
Member GM FADN GM costs prices Set-aside 
State Premium 
wheat barley wheat barley 
B 820 680 170-420 
DR 950 330 840 640 137 
D 770 430 680 530 300-600 
GR 100-200 
E 103-300 
F 550 305 710 600 130-350 
IRL 590 300 740 470 120-350 
I 490 390 340 340 380-550 
NL 880 720 300-600 
UK 710 310 890 630 270-300 
To prevent surpluses as foreseen under the BRP and MOP scen-
arios, a substantial area has to be taken away from production in 
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1996/97; 8.3 million hectares under the BRF and 5.0 million hec-
tares under the MOP, taking into account a slippage effect of 
35 percent, which is not a very high figure (Blom, 1988(b)). The 
costs of the programme will vary between 2.6 and 3.7 milliard ECU 
under the BRP and 1.1 to 1.7 milliard ECU under the MOP. The 
higher figures are based on the Gross Margin for barley from the 
cost prices and the lower estimate result from calculations with 
the Gross Margin for barley on the basis of the FADN data. These 
will be the total costs of the programme: the EC and the member 
states outlays. Although they are high, they are less than the 
projected increase in storage costs (see table 2.13). Neverthe-
less, the total budget costs for the cereal, oilseeds and protein 
crops will increase with respect to the 1987/88 situation. But 
this increase is small In relation to the consumer gains. 
Is it a good and reliable instrument for the future? Maybe, 
but it has weaknesses. Even before the introduction of the set-
aside scheme, 10 percent of the arable land was already regis-
tered as fallow. Can this be taken into production while bringing 
the exploited area under the programme? If so, the slippage ef-
fect will increase considerably and the programme will become 
very expensive. 
From a societal point of view, it does not seem very reason-
able to idle land in a community where land is scarce; it can be 
used in many other ways, A relatively small number of hectares 
under the set-aside scheme can be defended by referring to it as 
a certain way of stockholding: a safety measure. 
A third weakness of the programme will be that within the 
member states certain regions will participate in the scheme 
while other ones will not. Especially the marginal regions will 
be taken out of production. It is not so sure that this result is 
politically feasible. 
While the set-aside programme may become attractive for the 
economically marginal regions, it is not for those regions that 
are marginal from the environmental point of view; areas with 
high inputs of fertilizers and agrochemicals. It will become dif-
ficult to explain to consumers and taxpayers why in some parts of 
the Community arable land is very intensively exploited, result-
ing in unacceptable environmental effects, while they have to pay 
for idling land in other parts. An explanation In the narrow con-
text of cost calculation will certainly and rightly not convince 
them, because not all the costs and benefits are and can be taken 
into account. Therefore it is promising that the Commission has 
given farmers a possibility to extensify. In the next section we 
will dwell for a while on this subject. 
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5. Extensification: the economics and the surplus problem 
5.1 Introduction 
Regulation 4118/88 introduces the possibility of financial 
support for farmers who extensify their production. It alms for a 
lower production level compared to levels reached with intensive 
production methods. Public opinion is very keen on environmental 
issues. In many countries, politicians of the established parties 
are being confronted with new colleagues in all sorts of 'green 
parties'. Therefore the environment will receive a more prominent 
place on the political agenda. 
Especially in the Northern EC countries, intensive produc-
tion methods in the arable sector are one of the topics. For some 
time, there has been a lively debate in the UK on nitrate levels 
in drinking water and the link to farmers' practices. The ample 
use of agrochemicals in arable farming not only increases produc-
tion per hectare but threatens many animal and plant species that 
seem not to be useful for crop production. Of course this is 
nothing new (Carson, 1971), but recently public attitude has 
changed. Farmers' practices will be monitored more critically by 
the public, and in the near future measures will be taken to con-
straint input. 
In this section we will try to give some evidence of differ-
ent practices in different parts of the EC with respect to the 
use of fertilizers and agrochemicals. On the basis of this infor-
mation, an efficiency index will be constructed to indicate the 
costs of the extensification programme. Furthermore, the possi-
bility of a profitable extensification for farmers without any 
programme will be evaluated. 
5.2 Data and assumptions 
The information presented is based on FADN data for cereal 
farms (1986). As there are no specialized cereal farms for The 
Netherlands in the FADN, LEI-figures were used (Douma & Poppe, 
1988). The latter figures are data per crop, in this case winter 
wheat. The FADN data are averages for specialized cereal farms of 
a certain size class and a specified region. Taking the cereal 
farms only, we try to estimate the input of fertilizers and agro-
chemicals for cereal production. 
All groups taken into account have more than 60 percent cer-
eals in their cropping plan, and on 80 percent of the farms more 
than 75 percent of the area is allocated to cereal production. 
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The average costs in ECU per hectare for fertilizers and agro-
chemicals were calculated separately. Furthermore the costs of 
these Inputs per ton of cereals (wheat and/or maize) were calcu-
lated. 
In a second stage of the analysis the costs and the benefits 
of fertilizers and agrochemicals are calculated, assuming a rela-
tionship between the inputs and the outputs. Technical data on 
this subject are rather poor, but there is evidence that gener-
ally speaking yield levels and yield increases can be explained 
very well by the level of these inputs. Genetic Improvement ac-
counts for half or more of the yield gains in well-watered rain-
fed areas, but the rest can be explained by management factors, 
especially fertilizers and chemicals (Clmmyt, 1989). Also the 
analysis of Weindlemaier (1978) shows a strong link between ni-
trogen use and yield gains, although we have to keep in mind that 
genetic Improvements and the amount of fertilizer use, are inter-
dependent. Table 5.1 shows some figures for fertilizers used in 
the agricultural sector, the Increase in fertilizer application 
from 1960/65 to 1980/85 and the price ratio between nitrogen and 
wheat. 
Table 5.1 Fertilizer applied and nitrogen I wheat price ratio for 
the EC member states 
Country 
B DK D G R E F IRL I NL P U K 
kg. nutrients/hectare 
Wheat 1985 256 298 92 286 212 125 278 
All crops 
1980/85 521 248 421 158 72 304 735 168 781 74 352 
growth rate Z per annum 1960/65-1980/85 
All crops 0.7 2.1 1.5 5.3 3.4 4.2 5.2 5.3 1.9 2.9 3.6 
Nitrogen/ 3.0 3.3 4.0 1.2 4.6 3.4 2.0 3.1 2.2 3.3 
Wheat price 
Source: Clmmyt, 1989; except information for Ireland: FAO, Ferti-
lizer Yearbook. 
Price ratios for DK,D,NL, calculated on the basis of FAO, Ferti-
lizer Tearbook and Eurostat, Price Statistics. 
It is no surprise that the level of fertilizer use is two or 
three times higher in the Northern EC member states than Southern 
30 
ones. Differences within countries such as Italy and France are 
obscured by the countries' averages. In the Southern part of the 
EC, water Is a more limiting factor and a higher level of ferti-
lizer application will not result In higher yields. 
Is the use of these variable Inputs efficient In all parts 
of the EC? It Is not easy to answer this question. Fertilizers 
and agrochemlcal8 are relatively cheap, but nevertheless 20 to 
40 percent of the Gross Revenues Is spent on these inputs. From 
research In the Netherlands, where a normal and Integrated arable 
farming system are compared, it is concluded that more than 
40 percent can be saved on fertilizers and chemicals by losing 
ten percent of the output (Meijer & Laikens, 1988). Rickard 
(1986) reports comparable figures for the UK. The implications of 
these findings and the consequences for the extensification regu-
lation will be evaluated with the efficiency index E, defined as 
follows: 
where: 
E - dG/dC 5.1 
dG is the change in Gross Revenues as a consequence 
of a change in input of fertilizer and chemi-
cals; 
dC is the initial change in input of fertilizer and 
chemicals. 
dG and dC are defined in monetary terms and assume constant real 
prices. If E-l the farmer is indifferent because he loses as much 
as he gains from a change in variable inputs. When E<1 the farmer 
will gain from lower input levels and the opposite is true for 
E>1. From an economic point of view we expect E-l, because in 
that situation marginal revenues are equal to marginal costs. 
This index evaluates the efficiency only in a very narrow econ-
omic sense. So we do not take into account the costs involved in 
the application of fertilizers and agro-chemicals, such as labour 
and machinery. Therefore if E»l a farmer has an economic incen-
tive to decrease these inputs. From an environmental point of 
view we may use very different measures, but we can at least in-
dicate if a farmer will lose very much by being forced to use 
less fertilizers and chemicals. 
5.3 Use of fertilizers and chemicals In the EC 
The input of chemicals varies much stronger than that of 
fertilizers. Chemical use varies from less than 10 ECU per hec-
tare In Spain to over 150 ECU in Schleswig-Holstein (D), The 
Netherlands, lie de France (F), Champagne-Ârdenne (F) and 
Piemonte (I). Fertilizer application is below 100 ECU per hectare 
only in some Italian regions: Calabria, Puglia and Basilicata; 
Greece, in Castillo-Leon (S) and Castillo-la Mancha (S). In most 
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areas of the EC it varies between 100 and 250 ECU per hectare. In 
some French and Italian regions more than 250 ECU per hectare is 
spent on fertilizers: Champagne-Ardenne (F), Aquitaine (F), 
Veneto (I) and Friuli-Venezia Giulia (I). There is no simple cor-
relation between fertilizer and chemical application. In some 
cases a low level of chemicals combines with high fertilizer use. 
However, it is never the other way around. 
Fertilizer and chemical application in ECU per hectare is a 
bad yardstick, because price differences and exchange rate ob-
scure the real use of these variable inputs. From an economic and 
ecological point of view, it is relevant to know how much is used 
per ton of cereals. There is no possibility to calculate in quan-
tities, but the value input per ton has been calculated (see fig-
ure 5.1). 
Mo representative cereal farms for Belgium, Luxembourg and 
Portugal are available. From the presented information, it can be 
concluded that the supposed intensive production in the northern 
European countries is mainly a chemical intensive production, 
Input Regions 
Fertilizers 
> 50 ECU per ton 
< 50 - >30 
< 30 
Agrochemlcal8 
> 20 ECU per ton 
<20 - >10 
< 10 
Aquitaine (F), Veneto (I), Friuli 
(I), Aragon (S), Castilla la Hancha 
(S), Castilla Leon (S). 
Bayern (D), France (except 
Aquitaine), Italy (except Veneto and 
Friuli), Ireland. 
Germany (except Bayern), The 
Netherlands, UK, Denmark, Greece. 
Schleswig-Holstein (D), Ile de France 
(F), Champagne-Ardenne (F), Picardie 
(F), Haute Normandie (F), Centre (F), 
Bourgogne (F), Piemonte (I). 
Germany (except Schleswig-Holstein), 
The Netherlands, Alsace (F), Poitou 
(F), Aquitaine (F), Midi Pyrenee (F), 
Lombardia (I), Veneto (I), Friuli 
(I), Emllia-Romagna (I), Marche (I), 
Denmark, UK. 
To8cana (I), Umbria (I), Lazio (I), 
Figure 5.1 EC regions according to the Input of fertilizers and 
agrochemlcals per ton of wheat 
Source: FADN. 
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while the fertilizer input is relatively low. It is somewhat sur-
prising to see that the most intensive fertilizer users are all 
found in the Southern part of the EC. The results may be a bit 
biased as a consequence of the method we used, as some of the 
Southern EC regions are important maize producers. Nevertheless, 
even if we take this into account the figures Indicate that fer-
tilizer input per ton of cereals is relatively high. It seems 
that looking for possibilities to extensify should not be limited 
to the North of the EC. 
5.4 The economics of variable input reduction 
What is the effect of a reduction of variable inputs on the 
Gross Margin and how costly will it be to stimulate farmers to 
adopt the extensification programme? These two related questions 
will be analysed with the efficiency index E as explained in sec-
tion 5.2. Eight scenarios are analysed: four with an Intervention 
price of 160 ECU per ton of cereals, and four with an interven-
tion price of 140 ECU per ton in order to indicate the effect of 
cereal prices on the intensity of production. It is assumed that 
the input of fertilizer and chemicals is reduced by 50, 40, 30 
and 20 percent respectively. In all cases, cereal output will de-
crease by 10 percent. We shall call them scenario I, II, III, and 
IV respectively. 
Under the assumptions of scenario I, it is in nearly all 
cases economically attractive to decrease inputs for wheat pro-
duction. If the intervention price is 160 ECU, there are some 
small farms in Denmark, the Scottish cereal farms and some size 
classes in Greece that will not reduce their Inputs (E>1). In all 
other cases E<1. Maize producers in the South of Italy and Greece 
will not reduce their inputs in both cases (E>1). 
Scenario II, which is closest to the findings in The Nether-
lands, shows efficiency indices smaller than one in many cases. 
Only in Niedersachsen (D), Nordrhein-Westfalen (D), Lazio (I), 
the small farmers in Denmark and most cereal farmers in The UK 
and Greece will not decrease their variable inputs for wheat pro-
duction. If prices are decreased to 140 ECU per ton, only Greece 
will use the same level of fertilizers and chemicals. Maize pro-
duction in Italy and Greece will remain as intensive as it is, 
but at cereal prices of 140 ECU per ton the Northern producers in 
Italy will gain by producing less intensively (E<1). 
A thirty percent reduction of variable inputs, scenario III, 
might be profitable for farmers in Prance and some Italian re-
gions (Piémonte, Lombardia, Veneto and Friuli) and also in Spain 
producing wheat. At a lower cereal price the following regions 
will join the former ones: Bayern (D), the remaining Italian re-
gions, Ireland and the larger farms In Denmark. The efficiency 
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index for wheat is only substantially above 1 (>15Z) in the fol-
lowing regions (low price case): Niedersachsen (D), Nordrhein-
Westfalen (D), Lazio (I), Greecet the UK and the smaller farms in 
Denmark. Maize production remains inefficient in the North of 
France (E<1). Under the assumptions of scenario IV there is no 
economic incentive to lower variable inputs. 
These results corroborate the findings in The Netherlands 
and those In the UK, because the figures indicate that it is in 
many cases profitable to use the amount of fertilizers and chemi-
cals as reported even when thirty percent reduction in inputs re-
duces yields only by 10 percent. In The Netherlands we expected 
on the basis of our calculations a 35 to 40 percent reduction in 
variable inputs to decrease yields by 10 percent. The figures for 
the UK indicate a possible 40 percent reduction of fertilizers 
and chemicals to reach the same decrease in yields. 
Before discussing the implications, some remarks have to be 
made about the analyses. In the first place only data for 1986 
were analysed. Therefore the results are influenced by accidental 
circumstances, such as the weather. A three year average will 
give a more reliable picture. In the second place we made an ex-
post analysis, while the farmer has to decide ex-ante. If farmers 
are using too much variable inputs it might be explained as a 
form of insurance; he does not know the weather in advance, so he 
will be sure that a maximum yield is possible under all circum-
stances. In the third place, a drawback of the analysis is that 
no variable inputs for the different crops are available. This is 
only partly overcome by using data from cereal farms. 
The analysis shows that it is important to know the link be-
tween yield and variable inputs. If findings in The Netherlands 
and the UK are representative for cereal farming practices in 
Northern Europe, there will be a strong Incentive to lower input 
levels. Even in the case that a thirty percent reduction of in-
puts reduces yields by 10 percent, it is attractive to do so. The 
more so if we take into account that a ten percent reduction of 
the wheat yields In the Northern EC member states, including 
France, will decrease cereal production by at least 5 million 
tons. During the last two years this would have resulted in a 
production volume of less than 160 million tons. As a consequence 
cereal prices would not have been decreased. 
Even if the Individual farmer does not gain from using less 
inputs, there is a very strong case to expect that they will do 
as a group. In that case they form a 'latent' group in terms of 
Olson (1980): a group without having coercive power. Together 
they are able to get a public good (a higher cereal price) but 
for an individual it will always be profitable not to diminish 
variable or even to Increase inputs as long as E>1. In principle 
COPA (Comité des Organisations Professionelles Agricoles) could 
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play a positive role in saving the environment and stop decreas-
ing farmers income at the same time. But of course the organiz-
ation will not be able to control such a change in attitude among 
farmers. 
On a national scale, farmers' attitudes can be influenced by 
research and extension services. Farmers should have a better 
understanding of the relationship between inputs and outputs in 
arable farming and more specifically in cereal production. On the 
EC level, the extensification regulation is Introduced and will 
stimulate farmers to decrease their output. The amount of money 
per hectare or per ton of cereals necessary to attract farmers to 
the programme has been calculated in the following way: 
where: 
and 
where: 
dY-dC - (E-l)*dC - PRhect (5.2) 
PRhect is the premium per hectare necessary to compen-
sate for the farmers' losses from producing less 
intensively 
PRton - PRhect/dYton (5.3) 
PRton is the premium per ton of cereals not produced 
necessary to compensate for the farmers' losses from 
producing less Intensively. 
dYton is the decrease in yields as consequence of 
using less inputs. 
If E»l, in the case farmers are efficient users of ferti-
lizers and chemicals PRhect is zero and no compensation seems to 
be necessary to lower yields per hectare somewhat, say up to 
10 percent. Well informed farmers, stimulating a different atti-
tude with respect to the environment will be the most important 
instrument to promote a more ecologically efficient way of pro-
ducing. As a by-product, prices will remain at the same level and 
surpluses will disappear. 
If E<1, in case farmers are using too much variable inputs, 
PRhect is negative and farmers should be better informed about 
the economics of production in their own situation. No financial 
incentives from the EC or national governments are necessary 
other than for research and extension services. 
If E>1, it is still profitable for farmers to increase vari-
able inputs and yields per hectare. PRhect will be positive and 
the level of compensation will depend on the gains foregone by 
not increasing the yields, that means the level of E and the cer-
eal price. Given the definition for E and a given price for cer-
eals, we can derive the following equation: 
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PRton - (1 -U/E))*Pcer 5.4 
where: 
Peer is the price for cereals 
As long as the cereal price for farmers is about 150 ECU, an 
efficiency index of 1.5 indicates that 50 ECU has to be paid for 
every ton of cereals not produced. The premium per hectare will 
depend on the expected increase in yield, given the value of E 
and the cereal price. 
Economists expect farmers to produce in an economically ef-
ficient way. Data from the FADN compared to findings in The Neth-
erlands and the UK seems to indicate that the assumption is con-
firmed. Therefore it might not be expected that E>1 in many 
cases. The possibility of E>1 has more relevance in relation to 
time as technological developments go ahead. For the future, re-
search should be directed to production systems that are more 
ecologically friendly and economically competitive instead of 
high yields per hectare only. 
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6. Implications for the future 
If the economics of cereal production show a trade-off be-
tween variable Inputs such as fertilizers and agrochemicals as is 
observed in The Netherlands and the UK, lower prices will stimu-
late lower inputs and consequently lower output. Or it will be no 
longer economically attractive to expand inputs, which will re-
sult in stable or much less increasing yields. 
under such circumstances, costly set-aside programmes to re-
duce production can be held at a minimum level. Nevertheless, 
prices should be kept under pressure for at least two reasons: 
1) farmers will be stimulated to use less variable inputs or not 
increase them; 2) the import of feed will not be further stimu-
lated so the internal demand can be kept at the same level or in-
creased. 
There seems to be less need for the stimulation of alterna-
tive uses for agricultural products in the non-food/non-feed sec-
tor, as suggested by Rexen and Munck (1984). But it should be 
kept in mind that technological development will go ahead and 
that the observed possible reduction of inputs will only be a 
solution for some time, maybe the next decade. In the long run, 
it is expected that yields will increase again with a somewhat 
different technology. This will give time for research into poss-
ible alternative uses for agricultural products in the non-food/ 
non-feed markets, and it should rank high on the research agenda. 
Given concern about the environment, special attention should be 
paid to the positive role that the use of agricultural products 
instead of synthetic ones can play with respect to the environ-
ment. From this point of view, research with respect to agricul-
tural production systems that are more friendly to the environ-
ment is also important. 
Lower prices will also be in accordance with the negoti-
ations under auspices of the GATT about a more liberalized world 
market for agricultural products. So there are several arguments 
in favour of a continuation of a restrictive price policy for 
cereals. On the other hand, it will be more difficult for farmers 
to compensate income losses as a consequence of lower prices in 
case yields are no longer rising. Consequently there is a strong 
case for compensating income losses not by increasing prices but 
through direct income support, for instance by giving a lump sum 
per hectare of arable land. 
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7. Conclusions 
If cereal yields Increase In the future as they dxd In the 
past« a restrictive price policy, implemented by means of MGQ's 
and supplemented with the set-aside programme, will only result 
in a reasonable market equilibrium if at least 6 to 9 million 
hectares are brought under the set-aside scheme in 1996. The 
costs of such a programme will be 2 to 3 milliard ECU per year. 
Since 1985 cereal production in the EC has been rather 
stable and yield increases have been zero or very low. The 
weather influences yields from year to year, but five years with 
low yields from the perspective of the trend is quite excep-
tional. The effect of price development on the use of fertilizers 
and agrochemicals may play a role in this development. If farmers 
were efficient users of those variable inputs in 1983 and there 
is evidence they were, they have had a strong incentive to lower 
them since than, as cereal prices has been decreased by at least 
25 percent in real terms. 
If a rational reaction to lower cereal prices is a decrease 
or non-increase of variable inputs and a consequent decreasing or 
stable yield, the income effects of a restrictive price policy 
are more negative than in the case of assumed increasing yields. 
No price losses are compensated by higher quantities. 
If farmers are still efficient users of fertilizers and 
chemicals there is little need for an extensification premium as 
lower Gross Revenues resulting from lower input are compensated 
by decreased costs. Research and extension services seem to be 
more important to inform the farmer about optimal resource use. 
As a restrictive price policy has the effect of using not 
more or even less fertilizer and chemicals, it stimulates an op-
timized use of these resources with respect to the environment. 
This argument and the fact that consumers gain substantially by 
decreased cereal prices while farmers face severe income losses, 
might be a good reason for giving a lump sum per hectare of 
arable land taking into account the average yield per hectare and 
the size of the farm. That will be a straightforward income 
measure, but as it seems now the extensification programme will 
have the same effect. 
Research into the link between input and output in real 
farmers' practices should be stimulated in order to decide on 
what sort of world we live in and to take the right policy 
measures in time. 
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